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Abstract
Cryptosystems based on the hardness of lattice problems have recently acquired much
importance due to their average-case to worst-case equivalence, their conjectured resistance
to quantum cryptanalysis, their ease of implementation and increasing practicality, and, lately,
their promising potential as a platform for constructing advanced functionalities.
In this work, we construct “Fuzzy” Identity Based Encryption from the hardness of the
standard Learning With Errors (LWE) problem. We give CPA and CCA secure variants of our
construction, for small and large universes of attributes. All are secure against selective-identity
attacks in the standard model.
Our construction is made possible by observing certain special properties that secret sharing
schemes need to satisfy in order to be useful for Fuzzy IBE. We discuss why further extensions
are not as easy as they may seem. As such, ours is among the first examples of advanced-
functionality cryptosystem from lattices that goes “beyond IBE”.
∗UCLA. Research supported in part from a DARPA/ONR PROCEED award, and NSF grants 1118096, 1065276,
0916574 and 0830803. E-mail: shweta.a@gmail.com
†PARC—Palo Alto Research Center. E-mail: xb@boyen.org
‡Microsoft Research and University of Toronto. E-mail: vinodv@alum.mit.edu
§UCSD. E-mail: pvoulgar@cs.ucsd.edu
¶CUNY. E-mail: hoeteck@alum.mit.edu
1 Introduction
Lattices have recently emerged as a powerful mathematical platform on which to build a rich variety
of cryptographic primitives. Starting from the work of Ajtai [4], lattices have been used to construct
one-way functions and collision-resistant hash functions [4, 27], public-key encryption [6, 32, 33],
identity-based encryption schemes [22, 16, 1, 2], trapdoor functions [22] and even fully homomorphic
encryption [20, 21, 15]. Lattice-based cryptography is attractive not only as a fallback in case
factoring and discrete-log turn out to be easy (which they are on quantum computers), but it is
also an end in its own right — lattice-based systems resist quantum and sub-exponential attacks,
and they are efficient, admit highly parallel implementations and are potentially quite practical.
At the same time, encryption schemes have grown more and more sophisticated, and able to
support complex access policies. Specifically, the idea of functional encryption has emerged as a
new paradigm for encryption. In functional encryption in its broad sense, a secret key allows its
holder to unlock data (or some piece or function of the data) based on policies and logic, rather
than by merely addressing the recipient(s). The usefulness of such a primitive is evident — access
to encrypted data moves beyond mere enumeration to potentially arbitrary functions.
Since its introduction with Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption by Sahai and Waters [34], several
systems have emerged that move beyond the traditional “designated recipient(s)” paradigm of
encryption. In this line of work, the key (or, in some variants, the ciphertext) is associated with
a predicate, say f , while the ciphertext (or the key) is associated with an attribute vector, say x.
Decryption succeeds if and only if f(x) = 1. Specifically, attribute-based encryption [23, 29, 9, 17,
25, 26] specifically refers to the case where the predicate is a Boolean formula to which the attributes
provide binary inputs. Fuzzy IBE is a special case where f is a k-out-of-` threshold function. In
predicate encryption [24, 25], the predicate f is to be evaluated without leaking anything about
the attributes other than the binary output of f(x), i.e., achieving attribute hiding along with
the standard payload hiding; known constructions are currently limited to inner-product predicates
between embedded constants and attributes living in some field, though.
Notably, all known instantiations of Functional Encryption are based on bilinear maps on elliptic
curves — and most are based on the IBE framework by Boneh and Boyen [10]. Non-pairing
constructions have remained elusive, even though factoring-based IBE has been known since 2001
[18, 12] and lattice-based IBE since 2008 [22]. This is even more notable in the lattice world,
where we now have an array of sophisticated (hierarchical) IBE schemes [22, 3, 16, 1, 2], but the
construction of more expressive functional encryption schemes has been lagging far behind.
Our contributions. We take the first step in this direction by constructing a fuzzy identity-
based encryption (fuzzy IBE) scheme based on lattices. A fuzzy IBE scheme is exactly like an
identity-based encryption scheme except that (considering identities as bit-vectors in {0, 1}n) a
ciphertext encrypted under an identity idenc can be decrypted using the secret key corresponding
to any identity iddec that is “close enough” to idenc. Examples arise when using one’s biometric
information as the identity, but also in general access control systems that permit access as long as
the user satisfies a certain number of conditions.
Our construction is secure in the selective security model under the learning with errors (LWE)
assumption and thus, by the results of [33, 31], secure under the worst-case hardness of “short
vector problems” on arbitrary lattices. We then extend our construction to handle large universes,
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and to resist chosen ciphertext (CCA) attacks. Finally, we point out some difficulties involved in
extending our approach to functional encryption systems.
Perspective. As reported by Boneh, Sahai and Waters in [14], the inability to move beyond inner
products in Predicate Encryption stems from the “bi” in Bilinear maps. This calls to mind the
well-known situation of yore, in partially homomorphic encryption [13] where the “bi” of bilinear
maps allowed the authors to compute only a single multiplication of ciphertexts. Gentry overcame
this obstacle [20, 21] by using lattices to construct fully homomorphic encryption. Thus, it is quite
likely, in our opinion, that lattices might be the tool of choice for taking predicate encryption
beyond inner products.
1.1 Overview of our Construction
Our construction borrows ideas from the pairing-based fuzzy IBE scheme of Sahai and Waters [34]
and the lattice identity-based encryption scheme of [3, 16], together with an interesting observation
about the Shamir secret-sharing scheme and the Lagrange interpolation formula.
First, consider the setting where the identities are `-bit strings. This corresponds to the setting
where there are ` attributes, and each attribute can take two values (either 0 or 1). Decryption
using SKid succeeds on a ciphertext encrypted under identity id′ if the bitwise difference of id and
id′ has Hamming weight at most k. We then show how to extend it to the case where the universe
of attributes is (exponentially) large in a rather generic way.
Previous lattice-based IBE. We begin by recalling the IBE schemes of [3, 16], which we
view as fuzzy IBE schemes where k = `. The public parameters consist of 2` matrices
(A1,0,A1,1, . . . ,A`,0,A`,1) ∈ Zn×mq (where n is the security parameter, q is a small prime, and
m ≈ n log q is a parameter of the system) and a vector u ∈ Znq . The master secret key then consists
of the trapdoors Ti,b corresponding to each matrix Ai,b.
We view the secret key derivation in the IBE scheme as a two-step procedure that proceeds as
follows: on input an identity id:
1. First, secret-share the vector u into ` vectors u1, . . . ,u` which are uniformly random in Znq
subject to the condition that
∑`
i=1 ui = u.
2. The secret key SKid is then a vector (e1, . . . , e`) ∈ (Zm)`, where
SKid
.= (e1, . . . , e`) and Ai,idiei = ui
The secret key ei is computed using the trapdoor Ti,idi using the Gaussian sampling algorithm
of [22].
This is a different, yet completely equivalent, way to view the secret key derivation in the IBE
schemes of [3, 16].
To encrypt for an identity id in these schemes, one chooses a vector s ∈ Znq and “small error
terms” x1, . . . ,x` ∈ Zm and x′ ∈ Z, and outputs
CTid
.= IBE.Enc(id, b ∈ {0, 1}) .= (AT1,id1s + xi, . . . ,AT`,id`s + x`,uT s + x′ + bbq/2c)
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The key observation in decryption is that if id = id′, then “pairing” each component of CTid′
and SKid gives us a number that is approximately uTi s. Namely,
eTi (A
T
i,idis + xi) = (A
T
i,idiei)
T s + eTi xi = u
T
i s + e
T
i xi ≈ uTi s (1)
By linearity, we can then add up these terms and obtain (approximately) uT s. The “approxi-
mation” we get here is not terrible, since the error terms eTi xi are small, and we add up only `
of them. Thus, the magnitude of the error remains much smaller than q/2, which is sufficient for
decryption.
Our approach. A natural thought to extend this methodology to fuzzy IBE is to use Shamir’s k-
out-of-` secret-sharing scheme in the first step of the key derivation procedure. Since reconstructing
the secret in Shamir’s scheme involves computing a linear combination of the shares, we can hope
to do decryption as before. As it turns out, the resulting scheme is in fact neither correct nor
secure. For simplicity, we focus on the issue of correctness in this section.
Recall that correctness of the previous lattice-based IBE schemes lies in bounding the decryption
“error terms” eTi xi. More concretely, the analysis bounds the “cummulative error term”
x−
k∑
i=1
eTi xi
by q/4. Upon instantiating the previous schemes with Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme, we need to
bound a new cummulative error term, which is given by:
x−
∑
i∈S
LieTi xi
Here, Li are the fractional Lagrangian coefficients used in reconstructing the secret, interpreted as
elements in Zq and S identifies the subset of shares used in reconstruction. Indeed, while we can
bound both the numerator and denominator in Li as a fraction of integers, once interpreted as an
element in Zq, the value Li may be arbitrarily large.
The key idea in our construction is to “clear the denominators”. Let D := (`!)2 be a sufficiently
large constant, so that DLi ∈ Z for all i. Then, we multiply D into the noise vector, that is, the
ciphertext is now generated as follows:
CTid
.= IBE.Enc(id, b ∈ {0, 1}) .= (AT1,id1s +Dxi, . . . ,AT`,id`s +Dx`,uT s +Dx′ + bbq/2c)
For correctness, it now suffices to bound the expression:
Dx−
∑
i∈S
DLieTi xi
by q/4. Now, further observe that each DLi is an integer bounded by D2, so it suffices to pick the
noise vectors so that they are bounded by q/4D` with overwhelming probability.
Thus, for appropriate parameter settings, we get a fuzzy IBE scheme based on the classical
hardness of computing a sub-exponential approximation to “short vector problems” on arbitrary
lattices.
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Additional related work. The idea of using Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme in lattice-based
cryptography appears in the work of Bendlin and Damg˚ard [8] on threshold cryptosystems. The
security of their scheme, as with ours, relies on the hardness of computing sub-exponential
approximation for lattice problems. In more detail, their scheme uses a pseudorandom secret-
sharing from [19] in order to share a value in some interval, for which they do not have to address
the issue of bounding the size of Lagrangian coefficients. Our idea of “clearing the denominator”
is inspired by the work on factoring-based threshold cryptography (e.g. [35]), where the technique
is used to handle a different technical issue: evaluating fractional Lagrangian coefficients over an
“unknown” modulus φ(N), where N is a public RSA modulus.
2 Preliminaries
Notation: We use uppercase boldface alphabet for matrices, as in A, lowercase boldface
characters for vectors, as in e, and lowercase regular characters for scalars, as in v. We say that a
function f : R+ → R+ is negligible if for all d > d0 we have f(λ) < 1/λd for sufficiently large λ. We
write f(λ) < negl(λ). For any ordered set S = {s1, . . . , sk} ∈ Rm of linearly independent vectors,
we define ‖S˜‖ = maxj ‖s˜j‖, where S˜ = {s˜1, . . . , s˜k} refers to the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization
of S, and ‖ · ‖ refers to the euclidean norm. We let σTG := O(
√
n log q ) denote the maximum
(w.h.p.) Gram-Schmidt norm of a basis produced by TrapGen(q, n).
2.1 Definition: Fuzzy IBE
A Fuzzy Identity Based Encryption scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
Fuzzy.Setup(λ, `)→ (PP,MK): This algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and the
maximum length of identities `. It outputs the public parameters PP and a master key MK.
Fuzzy.Extract(MK,PP, id, k)→ SK: This algorithm takes as input the master key MK, the public
parameters PP, an identity id and the threshold k ≤ `. It outputs a decryption key SKid.
Fuzzy.Enc(PP, b, id′)→ CT: This algorithm takes as input: a message bit b, an identity id′, and
the public parameters PP. It outputs the ciphertext CTid′ .
Fuzzy.Dec(PP,CTid′ ,SKid)→ b: This algorithm takes as input the ciphertext CTid′ , the decryption
key SKid and the public parameters PP. It outputs the message b if |id ∩ id′| ≥ k.
2.2 Security Model for Fuzzy IBE
We consider the notion of ciphertext privacy, which implies both semantic security and recipient
anonymity. Ciphertext privacy against a selective security, chosen plaintext attack is defined by
the following game.
Target: The adversary declares the challenge identity, id∗, that he wishes to be challenged upon.
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm of Fuzzy-IBE and gives the public parameters to
the adversary.
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Phase 1: The adversary is allowed to issue queries for private keys for identities idj of its choice,
as long as |idj ∩ id∗| < k; ∀j
Challenge: The adversary submits a message to encrypt. The challenger encrypts the message
with the challenge identity id∗ and then flips a random coin r. If r = 1, the ciphertext is
given to the adversary, otherwise a random element of the ciphertext space is returned.
Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated.
Guess: The adversary outputs a guess r′ of r. The advantage of an adversary A in this game is
defined as |Pr[r′ = r]− 12 |
A Fuzzy Identity Based Encryption scheme is secure in the Selective-Set model of security if all
polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the Selective-Set game.
The adaptive version of the above game is identical except it does not have the target step,
hence the adversary is allowed to choose an attack identity adversarially.
3 Preliminaries: Lattices
Throughout the paper, we let the parameters q = q(λ),m = m(λ), n = n(λ) are polynomial
functions of the security parameter λ.
3.1 Random Integer Lattices
Definition 1. Let B =
[
b1
∣∣ . . . ∣∣ bm ] ∈ Rm×m be an m×m matrix whose columns are linearly
independent vectors b1, . . . ,bm ∈ Rm. The m-dimensional full-rank lattice Λ generated by B is
the infinite periodic set,
Λ = L(B) =
{
y ∈ Rm s.t. ∃s = (s1, . . . , sm) ∈ Zm , y = B s =
m∑
i=1
si bi
}
Here, we are interested in integer lattices, i.e, infinite periodic subsets of Zm, that are invariant
under translation by multiples of some integer q in each of the coordinates.
Definition 2. For q prime and A ∈ Zn×mq and u ∈ Znq , define:
Λ⊥q (A) =
{
e ∈ Zm s.t. A e = 0 (mod q) }
Λuq (A) =
{
e ∈ Zm s.t. A e = u (mod q) }
3.2 Trapdoors for Lattices: The algorithm TrapGen
Ajtai [5] showed how to sample an essentially uniform matrix A ∈ Zn×mq with an associated full-
rank set TA ⊂ Λ⊥(A) of low-norm vectors. We will use an improved version of Ajtai’s basis
sampling algorithm due to Alwen and Peikert [7]:
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Proposition 3 ([7]). Let n = n(λ), q = q(λ),m = m(λ) be positive integers with q ≥ 2 and
m ≥ 5n log q. There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm TrapGen that outputs a pair
A ∈ Zn×mq ,TA ∈ Zm×mq such that A is statistically close to uniform and TA is a basis for Λ⊥(A)
with length L = ‖T˜A‖ ≤ m · ω(
√
logm) with all but n−ω(1) probability.
3.3 Discrete Gaussians
Definition 4. Let m ∈ Z>0 be a positive integer and Λ ⊂ Rm an m-dimensional lattice. For any
vector c ∈ Rm and any positive parameter σ ∈ R>0, we define:
ρσ,c(x) = exp
(
−pi ‖x−c‖2
σ2
)
: a Gaussian-shaped function on Rm with center c and parameter σ,
ρσ,c(Λ) =
∑
x∈Λ ρσ,c(x) : the (always converging) discrete integral of ρσ,c over the lattice Λ,
DΛ,σ,c : the discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ with center c and parameter σ,
∀y ∈ Λ , DΛ,σ,c(y) = ρσ,c(y)
ρσ,c(Λ)
For notational convenience, ρσ,0 and DΛ,σ,0 are abbreviated as ρσ and DΛ,σ.
3.3.1 Sampling Discrete Gaussians over Lattices
Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan [22] construct the following algorithm for sampling from the
discrete Gaussian DΛ,σ,c, given a basis B for the m-dimensional lattice Λ with σ ≥ ‖B˜‖·ω(
√
logm).
Specialized to the case of random lattices, they show an algorithm
Algorithm SamplePre(A,TA,u, σ): On input a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq with ‘short’ trapdoor basis
TA for Λ⊥q (A), a target image u ∈ Znq and a Gaussian parameter σ ≥ ‖T˜A‖ · ω(
√
logm), outputs
a sample e ∈ Zmq from a distribution that is within negligible statistical distance of DΛuq (A),σ.
3.4 Sampling from an “Encryption” matrix
We will also need the following algorithm defined in [1]:
Algorithm SampleLeft(A,M1,TA,u, σ):
Inputs: a rank n matrix A in Zn×mq and a matrix M1 in Zn×m1q ,
a “short” basis TA of Λ⊥q (A) and a vector u ∈ Znq ,
a gaussian parameter σ > ‖T˜A‖ · ω(
√
log(m+m1)).
(2)
Output: Let F1 := (A | M1). The algorithm outputs a vector e ∈ Zm+m1 sampled from a
distribution statistically close to DΛuq (F1),σ. In particular, e ∈ Λuq (F1).
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3.5 Two Lemmas to Bound Norms
The following lemma about the distribution Ψα will be needed to show that decryption works
correctly. The proof is implicit in [22, Lemma 8.2].
Lemma 5. Let e be some vector in Zm and let y R← Ψmα . Then the quantity |e>y| treated as an
integer in [0, q − 1] satisfies
|e>y| ≤ ‖e‖ qαω(
√
logm ) + ‖e‖√m/2
with all but negligible probability in m.
Micciancio and Regev showed that the norm of vectors sampled from discrete Gaussians is small
with high probability.
Proposition 6 ([28]). For any lattice Λ of integer dimension m, any lattice point c, and any two
reals  ∈ (0, 1) and σ ≥ ω(√logm),
Pr
{
x ∼ DΛ,σ,c : ‖x− c‖ >
√
mσ
}
≤ 1 + 
1−  2
−m
3.6 Hardness Assumption
The LWE (learning with errors) problem was first defined by [33], and has since been extensively
studied and used. For polynomially bounded modulus q, the computational and decisional versions
are equivalent. We give the following convenient restatement of the latter:
Definition 7. Consider a prime q, a positive integer n, and a distribution χ over Zq, all public.
An (Zq, n, χ)-LWE problem instance consists of access to an unspecified challenge oracle O, being,
either, a noisy pseudo-random sampler Os carrying some constant random secret key s ∈ Znq , or, a
truly random sampler O$, whose behaviors are respectively as follows:
Os: outputs noisy pseudo-random samples of the form (wi, vi) =
(
wi, wTi s+xi
) ∈ Znq ×Zq, where,
s ∈ Znq is a uniformly distributed persistent secret key that is invariant across invocations,
xi ∈ Zq is a freshly generated ephemeral additive noise component with distribution χ, and
wi ∈ Znq is a fresh uniformly distributed vector revealed as part of the output.
O$: outputs truly random samples
(
wi, vi
) ∈ Znq ×Zq, drawn independently uniformly at random
in the entire domain Znq × Zq.
The (Zq, n, χ)-LWE problem statement, or LWE for short, allows an unspecified number of queries
to be made to the challenge oracle O, with no stated prior bound. We say that an algorithm A
decides the (Zq, n, χ)-LWE problem if
∣∣Pr[AOs = 1]− Pr[AO$ = 1]∣∣ is non-negligible for a random
s ∈ Znq .
The confidence in the hardness of the LWE problem stems in part from a result of Regev [33]
which shows that the for certain noise distributions χ, the LWE problem is as hard as the worst-case
SIVP and GapSVP under a quantum reduction (see also [30]). A classical reduction with related
parameters was later obtained by Peikert [31].
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Proposition 8 ([33]). Consider a real parameter α = α(n) ∈ (0, 1) and a prime q = q(n) > 2√n/α.
Denote by T = R/Z the group of reals [0, 1) with addition modulo 1. Denote by Ψα the distribution
over T of a normal variable with mean 0 and standard deviation α/
√
2pi then reduced modulo 1.
Denote by bxe = bx + 12c the nearest integer to the real x ∈ R. Denote by Ψ¯α the discrete
distribution over Zq of the random variable bq Xe mod q where the random variable X ∈ T has
distribution Ψα.
Then, if there exists an efficient, possibly quantum, algorithm for deciding the (Zq, n, Ψ¯α)-LWE
problem, there exists a quantum q·poly(n)-time algorithm for approximating the SIVP and GapSVP
problems, to within O˜(n/α) factors in the `2 norm, in the worst case.
Since the best known algorithms for 2k-approximations of gapSVP and SIVP run in time
2 eO(n/k)), it follows from the above that the LWE problem with the noise ratio α = 2−n is likely
hard for some constant  < 1.
4 The Fuzzy IBE Scheme
Let λ ∈ Z+ be a security parameter. Let q = q(λ) be a prime, n = n(λ) and m = m(λ) two
positive integers, and σ = σ(λ) and α = α(λ) two positive Gaussian parameters. We assume that
id ∈ {0, 1}` for some ` ∈ N.
4.1 Construction
Fuzzy.Setup(1λ, 1`): On input a security parameter λ, and identity size `, do:
1. Use algorithm TrapGen(1λ) (from Proposition 3) to select 2` uniformly random n ×m-
matrices Ai,b ∈ Zn×mq (for all i ∈ [`], b ∈ {0, 1}) together with a full-rank set of vectors
Ti,b ⊆ Λ⊥q (Ai,b) such that ‖T˜i,b‖ ≤ m · ω(
√
logm).
2. Select a uniformly random vector u ∈ Znq .
3. Output the public parameters and master key,
PP =
(
{Ai,b}i∈[`],b∈{0,1},u
)
; MK =
(
{Ti,b}i∈[`],b∈{0,1}
)
Fuzzy.Extract(PP,MK, id, k): On input public parameters PP, a master key MK, an identity id ∈
{0, 1}` and threshold k ≤ `, do:
1. Construct ` shares of u = (u1, ..., un) ∈ Znq using a Shamir secret-sharing scheme applied
to each co-ordinate of u independently. Namely, for each j ∈ [n], choose a uniformly
random polynomial pj ∈ Zq[x] of degree k − 1 such that pj(0) = uj .
Construct the jth share vector
uˆj = (uˆj,1, . . . , uˆj,n)
def= (p1(j), p2(j), . . . , pn(j)) ∈ Znq
Looking ahead (to decryption), note that for all J ⊂ [`] such that |J | ≥ k, we can
compute fractional Lagrangian coefficients Lj such that u =
∑
j∈J Lj · uˆj (mod q).
That is, we interpret Lj as a fraction of integers, which we can also evaluate (mod q).
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2. Using trapdoor MK and the algorithm SamplePre from Section 3.3.1, find ej ∈ Zm such
that Aj,idj · ej = uˆj , for j ∈ [`].
3. Output the secret key for id as (e1, . . . , e`).
Fuzzy.Enc(PP, id, b): On input public parameters PP, an identity id, and a message b ∈ {0, 1}, do:
1. Let D def= (`!)2.
2. Choose a uniformly random s R← Znq .
3. Choose a noise term x← χ{α,q} and xi ← χ{α,q}m,
4. Set c0 ← u> s +Dx+ bb q2c ∈ Zq.
5. Set ci ← Ai,idi> s +Dxi ∈ Zmq for all i ∈ [`].
6. Output the ciphertext CTid := (c0, {ci}i∈[`]).
Fuzzy.Dec(PP, SKid,CTid′): On input parameters PP, a private key SKid, and a ciphertext CTid′ :
1. Let J ⊂ [`] denote the set of matching bits in id and id′. If |J | < k, output ⊥. Otherwise,
we can compute fractional Lagrangian coefficients Lj so that∑
j∈J
LjAjej = u (mod q)
2. Compute r ← c0 −
∑
j∈J Lj · e>j cj (mod q). View it as the integer r ∈ [−b q2c, b q2c) ⊂ Z.
3. If |r| < q4 , output 0, else output 1.
4.1.1 Correctness
To establish correctness for decryption, we only need to consider the case |J | ≥ k. Let Lj be the
fractional Lagrangian coefficients as described above. Then,
r = c0 −
∑
j∈J
Lj e>j cj (mod q) (3)
= u> s +Dx+ b
⌊q
2
⌋
−
∑
j∈J
Lj e>j (Aj
> s +D · xj) (mod q)
= b
⌊q
2
⌋
+
(
u> s−
∑
j∈J
(Lj Ajej)> s
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0 (mod q)
+
(
Dx−
∑
j∈J
DLje>j xj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈ 0
(mod q) ≈ b
⌊q
2
⌋
It suffices to set the parameters so that with overwhelming probability,
|Dx−
∑
j∈J
DLje>j xj | ≤ D|x|+
∑
j∈J
D2|e>j xj | < q/4 (4)
For the first inequality, we use the following lemma on Lagrangian coefficients which states that
the numbers DLj are integers bounded above by D2 ≤ (`!)4.
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Lemma 9. Let D = (`!)2. Given k ≤ ` numbers I1, . . . , Ik ∈ [1 . . . `], define the Lagrangian
coefficients
Lj =
∏
i 6=j
−Ii
(Ij − Ii)
Then, for every 1 ≤ j ≤ k, DLj is an integer, and |DLj | ≤ D2 ≤ (`!)4.
Proof. To see this, note that the denominator of the jth Lagrange coefficient Lj is of the form
dj =
∏
i 6=j
(Ij − Ii)
The numbers |Ij − Ii| lie in the interval [−(`− 1), . . . , (`− 1)], and they can repeat at most twice
(namely, for every number n ∈ [`], there are at most two i, i′ such that |Ij − Ii| = |Ij − Ii′ |).
Since each of the factors Ij − Ii can appear at most twice in absolute value, (`!)2 divides dj .
Thus, DLj is an integer. Also,
|DLj | ≤ D ·
∣∣∏
j 6=i
(−Ii)
∣∣ ≤ (`!)3
4.2 Proof of Security
We show that the Fuzzy IBE construction provides ciphertext privacy under a selective identity
attack as in Definition 2.2. Recall that ciphertext privacy means that the challenge ciphertext
is indistinguishable from a random element in the ciphertext space. More precisely, we have the
following theorem:
Theorem 10. If there exists a PPT adversary A with advantage  > 0 against the selective security
game for the Fuzzy IBE scheme of Section 4.1, then there exists a PPT algorithm B that decides
the LWE problem with advantage /(`+ 1).
Proof. Recall from Definition 7 that an LWE problem instance is provided as a sampling oracle O
which can be either truly random O$ or noisy pseudo-random Os for some secret key s ∈ Znq . The
simulator B uses the adversary A to distinguish between the two, and proceeds as follows:
Instance. B requests from O and receives (`m + 1) LWE samples that we denote as (w1, v1),
{(w11, v11), (w21, v21), . . . , (wm1 , vm1 )}, . . . {(w1` , v1` ), (w2` , v2` ), . . . , (wm` , vm` )} ∈ {Znq × Zq}(`m+1).
Targeting. A announces to B the identity it intends to attack, namely id∗.
Setup. B constructs the system’s public parameters PP as follows:
1. The `matrices Ai,id∗i , i ∈ [`] are chosen from the LWE challenge {(w1i ), (w2i ), . . . , (wmi )}i∈[`].
The ` matrices Ai,id∗i , i ∈ [`] are chosen using TrapGen with a trapdoor Ti,id∗i .
2. The vector u is constructed from the LWE challenge, u = w1.
The public parameters are returned to the adversary.
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Queries. B answers each private-key extraction query for identity id as follows:
1. Let id ∩ id∗ := I ⊂ [`] and let |I| = t < k. Then, note that B has trapdoors for the
matrices corresponding to the set I¯, where |I¯| = `− t. W.l.o.g., we assume that the first
t bits of id are equal to id∗.
2. Represent the shares of u symbolically as uˆi = u + a1i + a2i2 + . . . + ak−1ik−1 where
a1, . . . ,ak−1 are vector variables of length n each.
3. For i s.t. id∗i = idi, pick ei randomly using algorithm SampleGaussian. Set uˆi :=
Ai,idiei; i ∈ [t].
4. Since t ≤ k − 1, and there are k − 1 variables a1........ak−1, by choosing k − 1− t shares
uˆt+1, . . . , uˆk−1 randomly, the values for a1........ak−1 are determined. This determines
all ` shares uˆ1, . . . , uˆ`.
5. To find ej s.t. Aj,idjej = uˆj for j = t+ 1, . . . `, invoke SamplePre(Aj,idj ,Tj,idj , uˆj , σ).
6. Return (e1, . . . , e`).
Note that the distribution of the public parameters and keys in the real scheme is statistically
indistinguishable from that in the simulation.
Challenge. A outputs a message bit b∗ ∈ {0, 1}. B responds with a challenge ciphertext for id∗:
1. Let c0 = Dv1 + bbq/2e.
2. Let ci = (Dv1i , Dv
2
i .....Dv
m
i ) for i ∈ [`].
Guess. The adversary A outputs a guess b′. The simulator B uses that guess to determine an
answer on the LWE oracle: Output “genuine” if b′ = b∗, else output “random”.
4.3 Parameters
We set the parameters to ensure that the decoding works with high probability, and that the
security reductions are meaningful. Our security parameter is n, and given (an upper bound on)
`, the size of the universe, the rest of the parameters are set under the following constraints:
1. For the lattice trapdoor generation algorithm of Alwen and Peikert [7], we need m ≥ 5n log q.
Given this constraint on m, the TrapGen algorithm outputs a basis of (Gram-Schmidt) length
at most m ·√logm. Using the SamplePre algorithm, the secret key vectors ej are drawn from
a discrete Gaussian with standard deviation σ ≥ m · logm (using the SamplePre algorithm),
and thus, by Proposition 6, have length at most σ
√
m ≤ m1.5 ·logm with all but exponentially
small probability.
2. We set the noise distribution χ = Ψmα , where α ≥ 2
√
m/q in order to apply Regev’s reduction
(see Lemma 8). A vector x sampled from this distribution has length O(αq
√
m) ≤ 2m with
all but exponentially small probability.
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3. For the correctness to hold, we need to satisfy equation 4. Since D = (`!)2, we have
D|x|+
∑
j∈J
D2|e>j xj | ≤ D · αq
√
m+ ` ·D2 · (αq√m ·m1.5 logm · √m)
≤ 4 ·m3 logm · `(`!)4 ≤ m3 logm · 25`
where we used the fact that (`!)4 ≤ (`)4` ≤ 25`. Setting q ≥ m3 logm ·25` ensures correctness.
As for concrete parameters settings under these constraints, given a constant  ∈ (0, 1), we set:
• The security parameter n = `1/.
• The modulus q to be a prime in the interval [n625`, 2 · n625`].
• m = n1.5 ≥ 5n log q, satisfying (1) above.
Putting together the last two bullets, we see that q ≥ m3 logm · 25`, satisfying (3) above.
• The noise parameter α = 2√m/q = 1/(25n · poly(n)).
Combining this with the worst-case to average-case connection (Proposition 8), we get security
under the hardness of 2O(n
)-approximating gapSVP or SIVP on n-dimensional lattices using
algorithms that run in time q · poly(n) = 2O(n). With our state of knowledge on lattice algorithms
and algorithms for LWE, security holds for  < 1/2.
5 Construction for Identities in a Large Universe
The construction outlined above can only support identities that are binary vectors of length `. We
desire to have the identities live in a larger space so that they capture more expressive attributes.
At a high level, we shall combine our small-universe Fuzzy IBE with a compatible standard-
model IBE, such as [3, 16, 1], to construct a Fuzzy IBE that can support large-universe identities.
In the scheme outlined here, we use the efficient IBE from Agrawal, Boneh, and Boyen [1] to provide
large-universe entities. Our identities are now `-vectors of attributes in Znq , while our parameters
are linear in ` (` depends on n however; see Section 4.3). Our large-universe construction follows:
Fuzzy.Setup(1λ, 1`): On input a security parameter λ, and identity size `, do these steps:
1. Select a uniformly random n-vector u R← Znq .
2. For (i = 1, . . . , `)
(a) Use algorithm TrapGen(q, n) to select a uniformly random n×m-matrix A0,i ∈ Zn×mq
with a basis TA0,i for Λ
⊥
q (A0,i) such that ‖T˜A0,i‖ ≤ O(
√
n log q)
(b) Select two uniformly random n×m matrices A1,i and Bi in Zn×mq .
3. Output the public parameters and master key,
PP =
(
{A0,i,A1,i,Bi}i∈[`], u
)
; MK =
(
{TA0,i}i∈[`]
)
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Fuzzy.Extract(PP,MK, id, k): On input public parameters PP, a master key MK, an attribute vector
or identity id = (id1, id2, . . . , id`) where idi ∈ Znq for each i ∈ [`], and a threshold k ≤ `, do:
1. Construct ` shares of u = (u1, ..., un) ∈ Znq using a Shamir secret-sharing scheme applied
to each co-ordinate of u independently. Namely, for each i ∈ [n], choose a uniformly
random polynomial pi ∈ Zq[x] of degree k − 1 such that pi(0) = uj .
2. Construct the jth share vector
uˆj = (uˆj,1, . . . , uˆj,n)
def= (p1(j), p2(j), . . . , pn(j)) ∈ Znq
Note that by the linearity of the Shamir secret-sharing scheme, there are co-efficients
Lj ∈ Zq such that u =
∑`
j=1 Lj · uˆj . In fact, linear reconstruction is possible whenever
there are k or more shares available.
3. For i = 1, . . . , `, do:
(a) For idi, construct the encryption matrix Fidi = [A0,i|A1,i+H(idi)Bi] as in [1]. Here,
H is some fixed Full-Rank Difference (FRD) map, s.t., for any id1 6= id2 in some
exponential-size domain, H(id1)−H(id2) is a full-rank matrix.
(b) Sample ei ∈ Z2m as ei ← SampleLeft(A0,i, A1,i + H(idi) Bi, TA0,i , uˆ, σ)
4. Output the secret key SKid = (e1, . . . , e`).
Fuzzy.Enc(PP, id, b): On input PP, identity id = (id1, id2, . . . , id`) ∈ (Znq )`, and message b ∈ {0, 1}:
1. Let D = (`!)2.
2. Choose a uniformly random s R← Znq .
3. For (i = 1, . . . , `), do:
(a) Construct the encryption matrix Fidi = [A0,i|A1,i + H(idi)Bi] ∈ Zn×mq as above.
(b) Choose a uniformly random m×m matrix R R← {−1, 1}m×m.
(c) Choose noise vector y
Ψ¯mα←− Zmq , and set z ← R>y ∈ Zmq .
(d) Set ci ← Fidi> s +D
[
y
z
]
∈ Z2mq for all i ∈ [`].
4. Choose a noise term x
χ{α,q}←− Zq.
5. Set c0 ← u> s +Dx+ b
⌊ q
2
⌋ ∈ Zq.
6. Output the ciphertext CTid := (c0, {ci}i∈[`]).
Fuzzy.Dec(PP, SKid,CTid′): On input parameters PP, a private key SKid, and a ciphertext CTid′ :
1. Let J ⊂ [`] denote the set of matching elements in id and id′. If |J | ≥ k we can compute
Lagrange coefficients Lj so that∑
j∈J
Ljuˆj =
∑
j∈J
LjFidj
>ej = u
2. Compute r ← c0 −
∑
j∈J Lj · e>j cj (mod q). View it as the integer r ∈ [−b q2c, b q2c) ⊂ Z.
3. If |r| < q4 , output 0, else output 1.
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Correctness. Correctness of the scheme follows from Section 4.1.1 and the observation that in
the large-universe construction, the encryption matrix Fidi behaves exactly the same way as the
matrix Ai,idi in the small universe construction. In particular Fidiei = uˆi, hence we can apply
Lagrange interpolation to reconstruct the vector u and decrypt as before.
Security. Because of the preceding observation, and because the IBE scheme underlying the
construction is secure from [1], the proof of security is a straightforward adaptation of the proof in
Section 4.2. The details are deferred to the full paper.
6 Connections to Attribute Based Encryption
A natural question that arises from this work is whether the construction can be generalized to
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) for more expressive access structures. Specifically, we could
ask that the secret key for a user be associated with a set of her attributes (e.g., “PhD Student at
University X”, “Ran in Boston marathon”) represented by some vector ~x, and the ciphertext be
created with respect to an access policy, represented by a (polynomial-size) Boolean circuit C, so
that decryption works if and only if C(~x) = 1. (Conversely, we could instead bind the policy C to
a user and the attributes ~x to a ciphertext.) In the world of bilinear maps, many constructions are
known [23, 29, 9, 17, 25, 26], the most general being for access policies that can be described using
Boolean formulas.
The difficulty of generalizing our construction to handle arbitrary Boolean formulas is quite
subtle. To see this, recall that Fuzzy IBE is a particular type of ABE where the policy is restricted
to a single k-out-of-n threshold gate. Since any monotone Boolean formula has an associated linear
secret sharing scheme (LSSS), we might imagine generalizing the Fuzzy IBE construction as follows:
1. During ABE.Setup, sample ` matrices A1, . . . ,A` with trapdoors.
2. During ABE.Extract, given a formula f , represent it as a LSSS matrix M, share u according
to M to obtain uˆ1, . . . , uˆ` (instead of using Shamir secret sharing). Compute ei, i ∈ [`] such
that Aiei = uˆi mod q and release e1, . . . e`.
3. During ABE.Enc: Say γ is a binary vector representing attributes. Then let ci = A>i s + x for
i s.t. γi = 1. Let c0 = u>s + y + bd q2e as before (x, y is Gaussian noise and b is the bit being
encrypted).
4. During ABE.Dec, if attributes γ satisfy f , we can find low norm coefficients ρi so that ρiuˆi = u
and decrypt by computing c0 −
∑
i ρie
>
i ci as before.
The problem with this scheme is that the shares uˆi, uˆj may be correlated; for, e.g. it is possible
to get u1 = u2 for queries such as (x1 ∨ x2) ∧ x3 and (x1 ∨ x2) ∧ x5, etc. Then, their preimages
e1 and e2 can be combined to form a short vector in the null-space of [A1|A2]. Over several such
queries, the attacker can then construct a full basis for Λ⊥([A1|A2]), that can be used to break the
challenge ciphertext for a target attribute vector such as 1100 . . . 00.
This problem does not arise in our Fuzzy IBE approach since we enforce the policy using secret
sharing based on Reed Solomon (RS) codes. RS codes have the property that given k shares,
14
either the shares are sufficient to reconstruct the vector u, or they look jointly uniformly random.
This property is crucial in the Fuzzy IBE simulation, and is not satisfied by the ABE generalization
outlined above. Thus, we suspect that new techniques will be required to construct Attribute-Based
Encryption from lattices.
7 Conclusion
We constructed a Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption scheme, selectively secure in the standard model,
from the hardness of the standard Learning With Errors problem. Ours is the first realization of
attribute-based encryption from lattices, and indeed, the first and only “post-quantum, beyond-
IBE” cryptosystem known to date. Extending the system by showing full security, or transforming
it to support more expressive attributes or predicates, are important open problems.
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A CCA security
Both our small-universe and the large-universe schemes can be lifted from CPA to CCA security
using standard methods [11]. Here we describe the extension for our small universe construction;
details for the large universe construction follow directly.
Specifically, we make use of a one-time strongly unforgeable signature scheme S0 to augment the
underlying FuzzyIBE scheme. The Fuzzy.Setup and Fuzzy.Extract algorithms remain unchanged.
During Fuzzy.Enc, the encryptor runs S0.KeyGen to obtain a public-secret key pair, which we
denote by (VK, SK). We assume that VK is represented as a binary string. Then, the encryptor
picks the identity id he wants to encrypt to, and sets id′ = (id|VK). Let CTid′ ← Fuzzy.Enc(PP, b, id′).
Next, the encryptor sets σ ← S0.Sign(CTid′ ,SK) and returns the tuple (σ,VK,CTid′).
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During Fuzzy.Dec, the decryptor first checks that S0.Verify(CTid′ , σ,VK) = >, and rejects if
not. Next, she uses her secret key SKid1 to derive a secret key SKid′′ for the “delegated” identity
id′′ ← (id1|VK). Such delegation can be done using the standard technique from [16]. Note that if
the Hamming weight |id− id1| ≤ k, then |id′ − id′′| ≤ k, and conversely. Hence, if the decryptor is
authorized to decrypt in the underlying scheme, she can use her extended key SKid′′ to decrypt in
the augmented scheme, and only then. The details are deferred to the full paper.
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